



Quantum AI

When ECC and RSA Break: Urgency of Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography

based on research published in *PRX Quantum*:

"Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities:
Resource Estimates and Mitigations"

doi.org/10.1103/j3xf-bw18

Ryan Babbush, **Adam Zalcman**, Craig Gidney, Michael Broughton, Tanuj Khattar, Hartmut Neven,
Thiago Bergamaschi (Berkeley), Justin Drake (Ethereum) and Dan Boneh (Stanford)

3 September 2026
Global Digital Collaboration Conference 2026
Geneva, Switzerland



Quantum AI

A significant portion of currently deployed public-key cryptography is based on the assumption that the **elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem** (ECDLP) is hard to solve.

However, ECDLP can be solved easily using Shor's algorithm on a **cryptographically relevant quantum computer** (CRQC).

ECDLP-based cryptography is widespread

**Hardware
Root of Trust**

**Electronic
Passports**

**Transport Layer
Security**

Secure Boot

**Multi-factor
Authentication**

Internet of Things

**Encrypted
Messaging**

Secure Shell

Blockchains

Structure of blockchain economy

ECDLP is hard
to solve

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions

Structure of blockchain economy

ECDSA

Schnorr
signatures

SHA-256

Groth16

cryptographic
schemes

ECDLP is hard
to solve

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions



Structure of blockchain economy

PoW mining

Taproot

MWEB

DAS

blockchain
features

ECDSA

Schnorr
signatures

SHA-256

Groth16

cryptographic
schemes

ECDLP is hard
to solve

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions



Structure of blockchain economy

DeFi

tokenization

confidential
transactions

self-sovereign
identity

digital
economy

PoW mining

Taproot

MWEB

DAS

blockchain
features

ECDSA

Schnorr
signatures

SHA-256

Groth16

cryptographic
schemes

ECDLP is hard
to solve

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions



Blockchain economy rests on a **false** hardness assumption

DeFi

tokenization

confidential
transactions

self-sovereign
identity

digital
economy

PoW mining

Taproot

blockchain
features

ECDSA

Schnorr
signatures

cryptographic
schemes

Actually, ECDLP is easy
(on a quantum computer).

ECDSA is hard

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions




Blockchain economy rests on a **false** hardness assumption


digital
economy

blockchain
features

cryptographic
schemes




53 qubits
2019



Sycamore

105 qubits
2024



Willow

53 qubits
2019

105 qubits
2024


Does it take five years to double
the number of qubits?



Sycamore



Willow



53 qubits
2019



105 qubits
2024

No.

**Adding physical qubits is easy.
The challenge lies in
implementing capabilities.**



Sycamore



Willow

53 qubits
2019

105 qubits
2024

Capabilities introduce
performance discontinuities.



Sycamore



Willow

Example 1: Quantum error correction

**Before: Quantum information in a
superconducting circuit survives for ~0.0001s**

Example 1: Quantum error correction

$$\varepsilon_d \propto \left(\frac{p}{p_{\text{thr}}} \right)^{(d+1)/2}$$

**Before: Quantum information in a
superconducting circuit survives for ~0.0001s**

**After: Quantum information in a
superconducting circuit survives for
essentially however long you wish**

Example 2: Copy-paste modules




Two 100-qubit
modules.

Example 2: Copy-paste modules



Now they can
exchange quantum
information.


The background of the entire image is a repeating pattern of light blue squares arranged in a grid. These squares are separated by thin, light yellow lines, creating a checkerboard-like effect. In the lower right portion of the image, there is a white speech bubble with a black outline. The bubble has a tail pointing towards the bottom right corner. Inside the bubble, the text "Now they're cryptographically relevant." is written in a black, handwritten-style font.

Now they're
cryptographically
relevant.


This example is a simplification focused

It is the scaling barriers and the device capabilities that set the timeline of progress towards cryptographic relevance.

What I think many people think will happen




What I think will happen



Beware expecting gradual progress

Once you understand quantum fault-tolerance, asking “so *when are you going to factor 35 with Shor’s algorithm?*” becomes sort of like asking the **Manhattan Project** physicists in 1943, “so *when are you going to produce **at least a small nuclear explosion?***”



<https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9665#comment-2029013>


Progress in quantum computing hardware is only one part of the picture.

Another is progress in quantum error correction and compiling.

Progress in compiling **is bringing the finish line closer**

2012 → 2024

Computational volume required for magic state creation



C. Gidney et al, arXiv:2409.17595 (2024)

Quantum attacks by onchain consequences

Security property breached	Example
<i>asset ownership</i>	transaction forgery in Bitcoin
<i>consensus</i>	deep blockchain reorganization in Ethereum
<i>confidentiality</i>	attacks on unlinkability of diversified addresses in Zcash
<i>monetary integrity</i>	creation of new coin in Mimblewimble sidechain of Litecoin
<i>solvency</i>	peg collapse due to illegitimate stablecoin redemptions
<i>data availability</i>	forging a data availability sampling proof in Ethereum
<i>governance</i>	vote forgery in Cardano
...	...

Quantum attacks by capability required

Attack mode	Operational demands on CRQC
<i>on-spend</i>	requires access to a fast-clock CRQC during attack
<i>at-rest</i>	requires access to any CRQC during attack
<i>on-setup</i>	requires knowledge of a universal classical exploit produced in a one-off quantum computation before attacks

Migrate to post-quantum cryptography (PQC)

DeFi

tokenization

confidential
transactions

self-sovereign
identity

digital
economy

PoW mining

Taproot

MWEB

DAS

blockchain
features

ECDSA

Schnorr
signatures

SHA-256

Groth16

cryptographic
schemes

ECDLP is hard
to solve

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions



Migrate to post-quantum cryptography (PQC)

DeFi

tokenization

confidential
transactions

self-sovereign
identity

digital
economy

PoW mining

Taproot

MWEB

DAS

blockchain
features

ECDSA

Schnorr
signatures

SHA-256

Groth16

cryptographic
schemes

ECDLP is hard
to solve

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions



Migrate to post-quantum cryptography (PQC)

DeFi

tokenization

confidential
transactions

self-sovereign
identity

digital
economy

PoW mining

Quantumroot

WOTS

falcon_verify

blockchain
features

ML-DSA

FALCON

SHA-256

STARKs

cryptographic
schemes

LWE is hard to
solve

random function
is hard to invert

hardness assumptions



Thank you!

PRX Quantum 7, 031001 – **Published 21 August, 2026**
doi.org/10.1103/j3xf-bw18



Ryan
Babbush



Adam
Zalcman



Craig
Gidney



Michael
Broughton



Tanuj
Khattar



Hartmut
Neven



Quantum AI



Thiago Bergamaschi
(Google / UC Berkeley)



Justin Drake
(Ethereum Foundation)



Dan Boneh
(Stanford University)